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Additional info for Deflationism: A Use-theoretic Analysis of the Truth-predicate (Stockholm Studies in Philosophy)
I nc o n t r a s tt oRa ms e y ‟ sl a c o ni cc omme n t sont r ut h ,Wi l l iams has devoted a small book (1976) to the subject. Its main theme is to find paraphrases of s uc hb l i n da s c r i pt i o n sa sFr e ge ‟ se xa mpl e“ Myc o n j e c t ur ei st r u e ” ,t h o ug h Wi l l i a ms ‟f a vo ur e de x a mpl ei st hes e n t e nc e (2) What Percy says is true. The method he r ei st oa ppl yak i n do fv a r i a n to fRus s e l l ‟ sa n a l y s i sofde f i n i t e descriptions, and the end result (1976: 38) is: (2a) (p)(q)((p = q Percy says that q) and p).
To the extent that it is, the definitions are implicit, and I do not believe I differ from others in failing to observe any such definitions introspectively. If some claim otherwise, I would challenge them to distinguish the observation of such a definition from the observation that one is simply disposed to assent to the (verbal) definition. When, later in this book, I will defend the claim that an equivalence of the kind mentioned i nThe s i s( I )e xh a us t ss p e a k e r s ‟s e ma n t i ci n t e r pr e t a t i onof“ t r u e ” ,Id os of o rt h er e a s ont h a tn omo r es e e msn e e d e dt o explain the data, and that the simplest theory is the best.
When we want to explain something, we want to do it by a finite number of other general claims, not an infinite number of particular claims. That seems to be in the very nature of an explanation, and accordingly, all philosophical attempts to analyse this notion refers essentially to laws or generalizations. 14 It may seem, however, that (MT) does not need to fare this badly, but that one can easily formulate the matter so that the explanans is not infinitary in the above sense. Could one not say that the perfectly generalizing and finite claim is that all the instances of (PS) are axioms of the Minimal Theory?